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For an American feminist.., reading The Newly Born Woman is
like going to sleep in one world and waking in another-going to
sleep in a realm of facts, which one must labor to theorize, and
waking in a domain of theory, which one must strive to (f)actualize.
-Sandra M. Gilbert'
It has been over a quarter of a century since, according to Mary
Joe Frug, "MacKinnon ... launched feminism into social theory
orbit. '2 In the context of the women's movement practice at the time,
my thought in taking up method was that women's situation lacked
and needed a full-dress theory of its own, and that the experience of
women had a distinctive contribution to make to political theory on
the epistemic level. Back then, my view was that the relation between
knowledge and power was the central issue that women's situation
and formal theory posed for each other, and that sexuality was where
this issue was crucially played out.3  Almost thirty years later, the
* These thoughts were originally given as a talk in Valencia, Spain, to the seminar on
Feminism and Politics for the International University Menendez y Pelayo (UIMP), University
of Valencia, on July 4, 1996. I had thought that the tendency criticized would wither away in
deserved obscurity; many have made related criticisms. See, e.g., RADICALLY SPEAKING:
FEMINISM RECLAIMED 279-420 (Diane Bell & Renate Klein eds., 1996). Students persuaded
me that this piece gave them back something that had been taken from them. For the
generosity of their insightful comments, and their kind attempts (however unavailing) to watch
my back, I am grateful to Martha Nussbaum, Don Herzog, Anita Bernstein, Marc Spindleman,
and Lisa Cardyn. I also thank Dennis Westlind, Paul Ferak, and Steve Moeller-Sally for their
assistance.
1. Sandra M. Gilbert, Introduction: A Tarantella of Theory, in HLP-NE CIXOUS AND
CATHERINE CLtMENT: THE NEWLY BORN WOMAN ix, x (Betsy Wing trans., 1986).
2. Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1992). The parts on method in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989), were essentially written in 1971 and 1972,
circulated, and then published in pieces in 1982 and 1983 in Signs, one part subtitled An Agenda
for Theory. The book as a whole was published 15 years later.
3. Unknown to me, Foucault may have been writing on similar themes at around the same
time or slightly later. Foucault's Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, containing some
brief abstract passages about knowledge and power in the first chapter, appeared in French in
1975; he spoke on the same ideas in public in 1978. See JAMES MILLER, THE PASSION OF
MICHEL FOUCAULT 233-34, 301-05 (1993) (discussing the knowledge/power relation as Foucault
expressed it during this period); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 HISTOIRE DE LA SEXUALITIf
(1976); POWERKNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977
(Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
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discussion launched then is far from finished.
I.
Feminism's development as theory is impelled by the realities of
women's situation. Women's lives, the women's movement has
found, have contours with content. Centrally, women's lives were
found to have been lived mainly in silence, of which existing theories
were ignorant. Almost totally silenced has been women's sexual
violation by men. Beginning in the early 1970s, direct engagement
with this social reality-not reality in the abstract, this reality in the
broken-down immediate socially lived-out concrete-exposed the
regularities and widespread extent and trauma of sexual abuse in
childhood, the pervasiveness of rape and other sexual assault, the
torture and shame of battering, the routine existence of sexual
harassment at work, in school and on the street, and the endemic
abuse constituted by pornography and prostitution. The extent and
nature of these practices and their place in sexual politics, hence
politics, were uncovered and examined. Once this genealogy and its
continuity with sexuality more generally was established, nothing
from the state to interest groups to culture to intimate relations
looked as it had. One implication was that both knowing and the
known had to be remade to contend with the role of male power in
constructing them.
This practical confrontation with the specific realities of sexual
and physical violation created feminist theory, including so-called
high theory, in form and content. That these realities were gendered
was not assumed, posited, invented, or imagined. Gender was not
created in our minds after reading philosophy books other people
wrote; it was not a Truth that we set out to establish to end academic
debates or to create a field or niche so we could get jobs. It was what
was found there, by women, in women's lives. Piece by bloody piece,
in articulating direct experiences, in resisting the disclosed particulars,
in trying to make women's status be different than it was, a theory of
the status of women was forged, and with it a theory of the method
that could be adequate to it: how we had to know in order to know
this.
This particular theory, so built, was a theory of sex inequality and
more broadly of sexual politics. In and from the experience of
woman after woman emerged a systematic, systemic, organized,
structured, newly coherent picture of the relations between women
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and men that discernibly extended from intimacy throughout the
social order and the state. Our minds could know it was real because
our bodies, collectively, lived through it. It therefore socially existed.
Nor did its diversity undermine its reality; it constituted it. We said:
this happens. The movement quickly became global, as women
everywhere identified sex inequality in their own experience and its
place in denying them whole lives.4 This particular cohered reality
was not an example of what a new way of thinking about knowing or
a new angle of vision produced by way of data; it was a specific reality
that, collectively conscious, called for a new way of thinking about
knowing.
Everything about this theory was, to repeat, particular. It was
not general. It was concrete. It was not abstract. It was specific and
grounded. It was not a uniform homogeneous unity. It was a
complex whole. The point of the discussion of method in Toward a
Feminist Theory of the State was to articulate the consequences of this
new knowledge and the way it was apprehended for theory-
specifically for the kind of philosophy that thought that a thought had
to be general and abstract, meaning free of particularity of position or
substantive social content, not experienced-in order to be validly
theoretical. And to connect this new information on what took place
in women's lives, silenced by prior theory, to law: law as a state
practice, one that has also claimed its validity in putting generality
and abstraction into a particular lived form backed by power and
authority. The point was to take women's experience seriously
enough-both the how and the what of it-to end the inequality. The
process was to get to the bottom of the theoretical constructs that had
covered it up and defined its reality as theoretically invalid and
empirically nonexistent or at most marginal, and had institutionalized
that theory and its products as governing norms in law.
"Women" was not an abstract category. "Women" in feminist
theory, in contours and content, was thus, as a theoretical matter,
formally largely new. Its content was the substantive experience that
4. See, e.g., SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL: THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
ANTHOLOGY (Robin Morgan ed., Feminist Press 1996) (1984). For analysis of the process in
the United States, see SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S
LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (1979), ETHEL KLEIN,
GENDER POLITICS: FROM CONSCIOUSNESS TO MASS POLITICS (1984), and RUTH ROSEN, THE
WORLD SPLIT OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA (2000).
For documents, see IN THE COMPANY OF WOMEN: VOICES FROM THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
(Bonnie Watkins & Nina Rothchild eds., 1996), and RADICAL FEMINISM: A DOCUMENTARY
READER (Barbara A. Crow ed., 2000).
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women in all their particularities and variations had. Not because the
theory corresponded to this reality, but because it was constituted by
it. This was not a general theory of particulars, it was a theory built of
these particulars: a particular theory. It was built on, and accountable
to, women's experiences of abuse and violation. Its grounded
construction and engaged accountability was not a posture it adopted
or a flag it flew. It was what it was made of, what it did. It did not
purport to be the one true account of how everything really is. It
claimed to be accurate and accountable to the social world that
constituted it. It related to the reality it theorized in this new way.
Feminism did call for rethinking everything. For one simple
instance, the distinction drawn since the Enlightenment between the
universal and the particular was revealed to be false, because what
had been called universal was the particular from the point of view of
power. For another, the subjective/objective division was revealed to
be false, because the objective standpoint-or so I argued in Toward
a Feminist Theory of the State-was specifically the view from the
male position of power. That is, those who occupy what is called the
objective standpoint socially, who also engage in the practice from
that standpoint called objectification -the practice of making people
into things to make them knowable-this standpoint and practice is
an expression of the social position of dominance that is occupied by
men. This standpoint is not positionless or point-of-viewless, as it
purports to be; it does not simply own accuracy and fairness as many
believe; it embodies and asserts a specific form of power, one that had
been invisible to politics and theory but, by feminism, lay exposed as
underlying them.
This theory was not an affirmation of the feminine particularity
as opposed to the masculine universal. It was not a claim to female
subjectivity or a search for it. It saw that these concepts, and the
purported divide between them, are products of male power that
cannot see themselves or much else. Until exposed, these concepts
looked general, empty of content, universally available to all, valid,
mere tools, against which all else fell short. Feminism exposed how
prior theory was tautologous to its own terms of validation, and could
hardly be universal because it had left out at least half the universe.
Neither did feminism precisely lay claim to the territory that
women had been assigned under this system. More, it was its claim to
us that we sought to disclaim. We were, not looking for a plusher cell
or a more dignified stereotype. We were not looking to elaborate the
feminine particularity as if it was ours; we had been living inside its
[Vol. 75:687
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walls for centuries. We were not looking to claim the subjectivity or
subject position to which we had been relegated any more than we
sought to oppress others by gaining access to the power to objectify
and dominate that we had revealed as such. All this would have left
what we were trying to challenge squarely in place; by comparison
with our agenda, it was playing with, or within, blocks. Identity as
such was not our issue. Inside, we knew who we were to a
considerable extent. Gender identity-the term introduced by
Robert Stoller in 1964 to refer to the mental representation of the self
as masculine or feminine -situates women's problem in the wrong
place.' Our priority was gaining access to the reality of our collective
experience in order to understand and change it for all of us in our
own lifetimes.
My own work provides just one illustration of how this
philosophical approach of theory from-the-ground-up has been
productive in practice. This theory, applied, produced the claim for
sexual harassment as a legal claim for sex discrimination. 6 So now,
when a woman is sexually harassed and she speaks of it, that is not
simply a woman speaking in a different voice, or narrating her subject
experience of her situation. She is saying what happened to her. And
what happened to her, when it happens, is now authoritatively
recognized in law as inequality on the basis of sex, that is, as a
violation of women's human rights. The civil remedy under the
Violence Against Women Act uses the same logic to recognize that
rape and battering can be practices of sex discrimination.7 Similarly,
Andrea Dworkin's and my proposed law that pornography be
recognized as a practice of sex discrimination is based on the realities
of the experience of women violated through the, making and use of
pornography. Under it, women's testimony about their abuse
through pornography would be recognized as evidence, so that
pornography is legally seen to do the injuries that it does in reality.8
The same approach produced the argument, adopted by the Second
5. See Robert J. Stoller, A Contribution to the Study of Gender Identity, 45 INT'L J.
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 220, 220 (1964).
6. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
7. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-
55.
8. See generally ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY
AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1988); IN HARM'S WAY: THE




Circuit, that when rape is an act of genocide in fact, it is an act of
genocide in law. That is, sexually violating women because they are
women of a particular ethnic or religious community aims to destroy
that community. 9
Just these few examples of the practice of this theory show a two-
pronged transformation taking place. By including what violates
women under civil and human rights law, the meaning of "citizen"
and "human" begins to have a woman's face. As women's actual
conditions are recognized as inhuman, those conditions are being
changed by requiring that they meet a standard of citizenship and
humanity that previously did not apply because they were women. In
other words, women both change the standard as we come under it
and change the reality it governs by having it applied to us. This
democratic process describes not only the common law when it works
but also a cardinal tenet of feminist analysis: women are entitled to
access to things as they are and also to change them into something
worth us having.
Thus women are transforming the definition of equality not by
making ourselves the same as men, entitled to violate and silence, or
by reifying women's so-called differences, but by insisting that equal
citizenship must include what women need to be human, including a
right not to be sexually violated and silenced. This was done in the
Bosnian case by recognizing ethnic particularity, not by denying it.
Adapting the words of the philosopher Richard Rorty, we are making
the word woman a "name of a way of being human."'10 We are
challenging and changing the process of knowing and the practice of
power at the same time. In other words, it works.
Feminism made a bold claim in Western philosophy: women can
access our own reality because we live it; slightly more broadly, that
living a subordinated status can give one access to its reality. Not
reality with a capital R-this particular social reality. Since women
were not playing power games or trying to win academic debates, we
did not claim privilege. We simply claimed the reality of women's
experience as a ground to stand on and move from, as a basis for
conscious political action. As it turned out, once rescued from
9. See Kadic v. Karadid, 70 F.3d 232, 241-42 (2d Cir. 1995) (brought against Radovan
Karad&n5 by Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim women survivors for sexual atrocities in his
genocidal "ethnic cleansing" campaign to eliminate all non-Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina),
cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996). A New York jury awarded the plaintiffs $745 million in
damages on August 10, 2000.
10. Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, 30 MICH. Q. REv. 231,234 (1991).
[Vol. 75:687
POINTS AGAINST POSTMODERNISM
flagrant invisibility, women's realities could often be documented in
other ways and nearly anyone proved able to understand them with a
little sympathetic application. Women turned the realities of
powerlessness into a form of power: credibility. And reality
supported us. What we said was credible because it was real. Few
people claimed that women were not violated in the ways we had
found or did not occupy a second class status in society. Not many
openly disputed that what we had uncovered did, in fact, exist. What
was said instead was that in society, nothing really exists.
II.
During the same twenty-five year period that this theory and
practice have been ongoing, a trend in theory called postmodernism
has been working on undoing it. Its main target is, precisely, reality.
Postmodernism, I will argue -or more narrowly, the central epistemic
tendency in it that I am focusing on-derealizes social reality by
ignoring it, by refusing to be accountable to it, and, in a somewhat
new move, by openly repudiating any connection with an "it" by
claiming "it" is not there.
Postmodernism is a flag flown by a diverse congeries, motley
because lack of unity is their credo and they feel no need to be
consistent. Part of the problem in coming to grips with
postmodernism is that, pretending to be profound while being merely
obscure (many are fooled), slathering subjects with words, its self-
proclaimed practitioners fairly often don't say much of anything." A
third part of the problem is that some commentators credit
postmodernism with ideas that serious critical traditions originated
and have long practiced. For example: "Balkin has been one of the
few legal writers willing to explore postmodern issues such as the
social construction of reality, the role of ideology, and the problem of
social critique.1' 2 Jack Balkin does explore these themes, calling that
11. A splendid illustration is the parody of postmodern writing that was in fact gibberish
that was accepted and published in a leading postmodern journal. See generally Alan D. Sokal,
Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,
SOC. TEXT, Spring/Summer 1996, at 217. Mr. Sokal said he did this because he was "an
unabashed Old Leftist who never quite understood how deconstruction was supposed to help
the working class." ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE:
POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS' ABUSE OF SCIENCE 269 (1998). The emptiness at the core of
some postmodern writing, deflected by jazzy footwork on the surface, is laid bare by Martha C.
Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1999, at 37.




work postmodern, but legal feminists have been exploring them in
depth for about thirty years, as have Marxists and some legal realists,
beginning long before, to name only some. Another part of the
problem is that postmodernism steals from feminism- claiming for
example that the critique of objectivity is a postmodern insight-and
covering its larceny by subsuming feminism as a subprovince of
postmodernism. 3
In any event, the appellation "postmodernism" does cohere a
constellation of recent tendencies and sentiments in theory. To trace
my particular theme, I analyze three issues that are central to women,
politics, and theory, to see what postmodernism has made of
feminism's methodological breakthrough just described. These three
issues roughly parallel Jane Flax's discussion of postmodernism as
revolving around the death of man, the death of metaphysics, and the
death of history.14 I do not criticize all that is called postmodern or
defend everything said by its detractors; in particular, the American
mutation I focus upon is distinguishable from some European
poststructuralists whom the Americans appropriate for a patina of
authority. Far from attempting to tar them all with this brush, I invite
anyone to disidentify with what I describe. And to stop doing it any
time.
A. "Women"
Postmodernism's rejection of universals has been described by
Lyotard, defining postmodernism, as "incredulity toward meta-
narratives."' 5 In its feminist guise, this theme runs under the criticism
of "the grand narratives" of feminist theory,' 6 questioning in the name
of "differences" whether "women" exist and can be spoken of, or
13. One aspect of this problem is illustrated by loopy readings that call everything that is
critical of the status quo "postmodern." See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern
Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 193 (1996) (calling my work postmodern throughout).
14. See JANE FLAX, THINKING FRAGMENTS: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND
POSTMODERNISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WEST 32-35 (1990). Flax's analysis is usefully
discussed by SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 211-30 (1992).
15. JEAN-FRAN(QOiS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
16. Lyotard writes of various "grand narratives" throughout The Postmodern Condition,
see supra note 15. Nancy Fraser and Linda J. Nicholson criticize the "quasi-metanarratives" of
what they see as nonpostmodern feminism. See Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, Social
Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodernism, in
FEMINISMJPOST-MODERNISM 19, 26-34 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). No "meta" I have ever
encountered has also been "quasi."
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died with "man." As Mary Joe Frug articulated this point: "I am in
favor of localized disruptions. I am against totalizing theory."'17 Anti-
essentialism is one facet of this objection: the view that there is no
such thing as "women" because there are always other aspects to
women's identities and bases other than sex for their oppressions.
The defense of multiculturalism is another facet of it: there is no such
thing as women in the singular, there are only women in the plural,
many different particularized, localized, socially constructed,
culturally modified women, hence no "women" in what post-
modernists imagine is the feminist sense.
If anyone does "grand narratives," I suppose I do, so I think I'm
entitled to say that I don't know that they're talking about. As to
"totality"-a bloated, overfed but also oddly empty term-what is
one against when one is "against totalizing theory"? Why doesn't
anyone say what is meant by the term? Why aren't there footnotes to
the charge? 18 One imagines it is a reference to Marx and Freud. It is
apparently a synonym for "universal," but, just to begin with, no
analysis that is predicated on a gender division can be a universal one.
Feminism has also never, to my knowledge, had what is called a
"monocausal" narrative, 19 at least I haven't. We do not say that
gender is all there is. We have never said it explains everything. We
have said that gender is big and pervasive, never not there, that it has
a shape and regularities and laws of motion to it, and that it explains a
lot-much otherwise missed, unexplained. It is a feature of most
everything, pervasively denied. That does not mean that everything
reduces to gender, that it is the only regularity or the only explanation
for things, the single cause of everything, or the only thing there. It is
also worth repeating that sexual politics, in feminism, is not an
overarching preexisting general theory that is appealed to in order to
understand or explain, but a constantly provisional analysis in the
process of being made by the social realities that produce(d) it.
17. Frug, supra note 2, at 1046.
18. An example of sloppy reading combined with the use of this term as epithet to spit on
feminist work, without citations, is found in Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science,
Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s, SOCIALIST REV., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 65, 77-78.
"Fragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust of all universal or 'totalizing' discourses (to
use the favoured phrase) are the hallmark of postmodernist thought." DAVID HARVEY, THE
CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 9
(photo. reprint 1990) (1989).
19. This charge is ubiquitous; one example is Celina Romany, Ain't I a Feminist?, 4 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 23, 23 (1991). A term sometimes used as a synonym is "reductionist." See
Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine
MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217,221 (1993).
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The postmodern critique of feminism seems to assume that the
"women" of feminist theory are all the same, homogeneous, a
uniform unit. I do not know where they got this idea either. Not
from me. They don't say. This notion that everyone must be the
same to have access to the label "women" is not an idea that operates
in feminist theory to my knowledge. That uniformity is a standard
theoretical property of a category does not mean that it is feminism's
concept of women. Women, in feminist theory, are concrete; they are
not abstract. They are not sex or gender, they are marked and
defined and controlled by it. Gender, in feminist analysis, is also
observed to be powerfully binary in society, but not exclusively so;
power divisions are observed to exist within sex-defined groups as
well as between them, so also in the feminist theory of gender.
Of course, feminism in one sense started the critique of
universality as currently practiced by showing how women are left out
of the human episteme. We took the critique of society as socially
constructed to a new depth by showing how even something often
thought by others to be biological -sexuality -is social, and draws
power lines. Feminism thus does not "assume, ' 20 it rather builds, its
"women." From women who socially exist. When feminism makes
its "women" from the ground up, out of particularities, from practice,
rather than from the top down, out of abstractions and prior theory,
the so-called essentialism problem cannot occur.21 The claim that
feminism is essentialist also serves to obscure the formative role of
women of color and lesbians, among others, in every part of the
feminist theory discussed. They as much as any, and more than most,
created the women's movement's, and feminism's, "women."
Postmodernism natters on about how feminism privileges
gender,22 but seldom says what that means either. If to privilege
gender means that feminism arranges gender at the top of some
20. Fraser and Nicholson falsely assert that social theorists like me assume the universal
significance of constructs like sexuality before constructing genealogies of them. See Fraser &
Nicholson, supra note 16, at 31; see also JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND
THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 1 (1990) ("For the most part, feminist theory has assumed that
there is some existing identity, understood through the category of women ....").
21. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White
Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
22. See, e.g., Jane Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, in
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 16, at 39, 45 (accusing feminism of "privileg[ing] the
man as unproblematic or exempted from determination by gender relations"); Fraser &
Nicholson, supra note 16, at 27, 34-35 (advocating the need to replace feminism's "unitary
notions of woman and feminine gender identity with plural and complexly constructed
conceptions of social identity, treating gender as one relevant strand among others"); see also
Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 63 (1993).
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hierarchy of oppressions, the allegation is false, at least as to me. I
don't do hierarchy. If these critics mean that feminists think gender
matters a lot, and often read situations in terms of dynamics of gender
hierarchy, and refuse to shut up about gender as a form of
domination, they're right. They should say why, in each instance, we
are wrong to do so, why its place in our analysis is unearned. Male
supremacy "privileges" gender; we criticize it.
A related argument is that feminism "essentializes" gender. One
concept of anti-essentialism (there are many) is defined by Tracy
Higgins, as "the rejection.., of the idea that particular characteristics
can be identified with women over time and across cultures." 23 It
seems to me that this presents an empirical rather than a conceptual
question. Do characteristics exist that can be identified with-
meaning found in the reality of-the status of women across time and
place, including by those women themselves? Women report the
existence of such regularities: sex inequality, for one. It is either there
or it is not. One does not oppose the observation that it is there in
the name of an idea that rejects thinking that it is there. Once it has
been found to exist, to say it isn't there, show it isn't there-show, for
example, that female genital mutilation is a collective delusion or
harmless or a practice of equality. Women worldwide say that society
after society contains practices that treat them unequally to men. To
contest this, find a society where they are equal, where unequal
practices do not exist. To contest the documentation of common
characteristics of women's status across time and place, show they are
not there. Of course, social reality has to exist to pursue this. What
the postmodernists seem to be saying here is that they don't like the
idea that women are unequal everywhere. Well, we don't like it
either.
Much of what has animated the critique of the so-called
essentialism of feminist theory is the criticism that feminism is
racist-that the image of "the feminine" in feminism, according to
this critique, has a white woman's face. This criticism applies to the
racism of the academy that calls itself feminist but refuses to
credential women of color as theorists or appropriates their work as
part of its pluralism while itself doing nothing any differently than it
did before. It also applies to the racism of the media that presents
itself as sympathetic but does not, for example, show how women of
23. Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV.
WOMEN'S LJ. 89, 91 n.14 (1996).
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color formed feminism since its beginning and continue to do so
today. It best criticizes the feminist face of liberal elitism that passes
for feminism in some quarters, including in the women's movement.
But unlike "essentialism," which sounds like you're talking theory,
racism is an ugly, academically nonpresentable, and risky political
word that pisses off white people. So instead of saying that something
or someone is racist, which they often are, we get the obscure
philosophical swear word "essentialist" or we hear that feminists do
not take "difference" into account.2 4
Nice neutral word, difference, and it has all that French
credibility. Never mind that differences can simply be fragmented
universals. It doesn't improve one's ability to analyze hierarchy as
socially constructed to add more pieces called differences if the
differences are seen as biologically determined to begin with. You
can have a biological theory of race just like you can have a biological
theory of gender, and you've gotten equally nowhere in terms of
dismantling social hierarchy. Put another way, if women don't exist,
because there are only particular women, maybe Black people don't
exist either, because they are divided by sex. Probably lesbians can't
exist either, because they are divided by race and class; if women
don't exist, woman-identified women surely don't exist, except in
their heads. We are reduced to individuals, which, of all coincidences,
is where liberalism places us. With its affirmation of women's
commonalities in all their diversity, it is feminism that rejects the view
that "woman" is a pre-social, i.e., biologically determined, category
and the notion that all women are the same. Feminism and
essentialism cannot occupy the same space.
The postmodern attack on universality also proves a bit too
much. Inconveniently, the fact of death is a universal- approaching
100%. Whatever it means, however it is related-to culturally and
spiritually, whatever happens after it, it happens. Much to the
embarrassment of the anti-essentialists, who prefer flights of fancy to
gritty realities, life and death is even basically a binary distinction-
and not a very nuanced one either, especially from the dead side of
the line, at least when seen from the standpoint of the living, i.e., as
far as we know. And it is even biological at some point. So the idea
that there is nothing essential, in the sense that there are no human
universals, is dogma. Ask most anyone who is going to be shot at
24. One example is Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42




Multiculturalism is a politically normative version of the
anthropological notion of cultural relativism premised on the view
"that all cultures are equally valid." 25 The postmodern version of the
multiculturalist critique assumes that the speaker takes their own
culture and its values to be valid, and criticizes other cultures from
the standpoint of their own. Feminism, however, questions the
cultural validity of subordinating women to men anywhere.
Feminism does not assume that "other" cultures26 are to be measured
against the validity of their own, because feminism does not assume
that anyone's culture, including their own, is valid. How could we?
Defenses of local differences, as they are called,27 are often simply a
defense of male power in its local guise. Male power virtually always
appears in local guises; one might hazard that there are nothing but
local guises for male power. The fact that they are local does not
improve them.
Two recent criminal cases in which a multicultural so-called
"cultural defense" was employed show this multiculturalism's
dynamic, particularly its erasure of indigenous women, in operation.
In Chen,28 a Chinese immigrant man who beat his wife to death with
a claw hammer was defended on the grounds that his rage and
violence at the imagined infidelity of his wife were normal in his
culture of origin. In another, Rhines,29 an African-American man was
accused of rape through physical force and verbal abuse of an
25. Higgins, supra note 23, at 95 (defining premises of cultural relativists); see Nancy Kim,
Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism
and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 56-59 (1993). Ruth Benedict is
generally associated with the view that differing views of right and wrong have no validity
outside their cultural setting. See RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 278 (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1989) (1934) (urging acceptance of cultural relativity as "a more realistic social faith,
accepting as grounds of hope and as new bases for tolerance the coexisting and equally valid
patterns of life which mankind has created for itself from the raw materials of existence"); see
also MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Values, in PERSPECTIVES IN
CULTURAL PLURALISM 11, 14-21 (Frances Herskovits ed., 1972); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights
and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303 (1982).
26. Feminists beginning with Beauvoir, together with antiracist analysts of race, largely
made "the Other" mean what it now means, so postmodernists did not invent that one either.
See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX xxviii (H. M. Parshley ed. & trans., Vintage
Books 1989) (1952).
27. A useful discussion of this theme can be found in Elspeth Probyn, Travels in the
Postmodern: Making Sense of the Local, in FEMINISMIPOSTMODERNISM, supra note 16, at 176.
28. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988). The Chen case is discussed in
further detail in Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism:
The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1996).
29. People v. Rhines, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Ct. App. 1982).
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African-American woman. His defense was that he mistakenly
believed that she consented to the rape because Black people are
routinely violent and yell at each other.30 Presumably the racism of
these assumptions is apparent, although the defenses were made in
the name of opposing the racism of white culture in punishing these
men for raping women of color and beating them to death. The
African-American woman in the rape case was very clear that she was
raped. If African-Americans yell at each other, she might be the first
to know what it meant and not be silenced by it into acting like she
wanted to have sex, or so he could think.
I would also like to know in what culture some men don't kill
their wives for perceived infidelity (or just because.. .), and in what
culture men are not supported in culturally-specific ways in believing
that force is part of sex. (Let's move there.) What postmodernism
gives us instead is a multicultural defense for male violence - a
defense for it wherever it is, which in effect is a pretty universal
defense. Pornography also provides an excellent cultural defense to
rape in most Western cultures: the more pornography is consumed,
the more difficult it is for men to know that they are using force when
they force women into sex-so they will culturally believe that
women consent to sex no matter how much force is used.31 Why are
we coming up with a multicultural defense for each culture in which
men specifically and particularly are permitted to believe rape is sex,
instead of looking at the assumption that rape happens in a man's
mind rather than in a woman's body in all of them? None of this
would be possible if the dissenting women of each culture-the
women who say, I was raped-were credited with knowing the reality
of what was done to them.
B. Method
Postmodernism as practiced often comes across as style-
petulant, joyriding, more posture than position. But it has a method,
making metaphysics far from dead. Its approach and its position, its
30. See id. at 483.
31. A recent meta-analysis concluded that, taken together, the body of experimental
studies shows that exposure to pornography increases rape myth acceptance-greater for
violent pornography but also holding true for nonviolent pornography. See Mike Allen et al.,
Exposure to Pornography and Acceptance of Rape Myths, 45 J. COMM. 5 (1995). The same
consequences of exposure were found in Japan. See Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi et al., Effects of Violent
Pornography upon Viewers' Rape Myth Beliefs: A Study of Japanese Males, 1 PSYCHOL. CRIME
& LAW 71, 77-78 (1994).
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posture toward the world and its view of what is real, is that it's all
mental. Postmodernism imagines that society happens in your head.
Back in the modern period, this position was called idealism. In its
continuity with this method, to offer a few examples, postmodernism
has made the penis into "the phallus" and it is mostly observed to
signify.32 Women have become "an ongoing discursive practice,"3 3 or,
ubiquitously, "the female body,"34 which is written on and signified
but seldom, if ever, raped, beaten, or otherwise violated. Racism and
homophobia are elided "differences" in disguise.
Abuse has become "agency" - or rather challenges to sexual
abuse have been replaced by invocations of "agency," women's
violation become the sneering wound of a "victim" pinned in arch
quotation marks.35 Instead of facing what was done to women when
we were violated, we are told how much freedom we had at the time.
(For this we need feminism?) Agency in the postmodern lexicon is a
stand-in for the powerless exercising power; sometimes it means
freedom, sometimes self-action, sometimes resistance, sometimes
desire. We are not told which of these is meant, precisely, or how any
or all of these things are possible under the circumstances. It would
be good to know. Oddly missing in this usage is what an agent legally
is: someone who acts for someone else, the principal, who is pulling
32. See BUTLER, supra note 20, at 55-60. For conflation of penis with phallus, see Drucila
Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644,
661-62 (1990); Ellie Ragland, Lacan and the Subject of Law: Sexuation and Discourse in the
Mapping of Subject Positions that Give the Ur-Form of Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091
(1997); Adelaide H. Vilmoare, Feminist Jurisprudence and Political Vision, 24 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 443, 455-56 (1999). To Lacan, of course, the phallus is not the penis, but the object of
desire for that which is lacked. See JACQUES LACAN, The Signification of the Phallus, in
tCRITS: A SELECTION 281, 285-91 (Alan Sheridan trans., W. W. Norton & Co. 1977) (1966).
My point is that the penis has a behavioral reality in male dominance-it does actual things-
and that theorizing "the phallus" has largely served to distract rather than to focus the project of
understanding what it does. The phallus in this discourse is abstract; the penis remains
relentlessly concrete, but not on postmodern pages, although even French feminists began
concretely initially. See, e.g., Benoite Groult, Night Porters, in NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS: AN
ANTHOLOGY 68 (Elaine Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron eds. & Ellisa Gelfand trans., 1980);
LUCE IRIGARAY, CE SEXE QUI N'EN EST PAS UN (1977); Dominique Poggi, A Defense of the
Master-Slave Relationship, in NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS, supra, at 76.
33. BUTLER, supra note 20, at 33.
34. This can be located in postmodern literature virtually at random, but a good example is
found in Butler. See id. at 79-141.
35. On "agency," see generally Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist
Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999), Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars
Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995), and
James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L.
REV. 489 (1991). Exemplifying "victim," see WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND
FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 93 (1995). The injury of social subordination is also rendered





Domination, postmodernists know exists, but they don't tell us
how or where or why. It is something that no one does or has done to
them but somehow winds up in "gendered lopsidedness. '36 What we
used to call "what happened to her," has become, at its most credible,
"narrative." But real harm has ceased to exist.
So whole chapters of books with "pornography" in their titles
can be written without ever once talking about what the pornography
industry concretely does, who they are, or what is done to whom in
and with the materials. 37 There is no discussion of how pornography
exploits and mass-produces sexual abuse. There is not even an
extension of the early work on the scopic drive by Foucault, Lacan,
and Irigaray (who are even French) - an analysis that is readily
extendable to describe the aggressive appropriation and trafficking of
women in pornography.38 Nor have I noticed the multiculturalists out
there opposing the spread of pornography from Scandinavia,
Germany, and the United States on grounds of cultural imperialism,
and it's taking over the world. The point of postmodernism is to get
as far away from anything real as possible.
Postmodern feminists seldom build on or refer to the real lives of
real women directly; mostly, they build on the work of French men, if
selectively and often not very well.39 Foucault, for instance, studied
some real practices, though he mostly missed gender, which from the
standpoint of feminism is a rather big thing to miss. Foucault's elision
of gender, feminist postmodernists try endlessly to fix, but his actual
engagement with reality-"I'm an empiricist"4°-they have totally
abandoned. Feminist postmodernism is far, far away from the
realities of the subordination of women. All women should be so
fortunate.
36. Frug, supra note 2, at 1052.
37. See, e.g., ROSI BRAIDOI, NOMADIC SUBJECTS: EMBODIMENT AND SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE IN CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THEORY 57-74 (1994); DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE
IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY & SEXUAL HARASSMENT 95-163 (1995).
38. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195-228
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1978) (discussing panopticism); IRIGARAY, supra note 32,
at 25-26 (describing women's entrance into "une economie scopique dominante"); JACQUES
LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 67-78 (Alan Sheridan
trans., W W. Norton & Co. 1978) (1973) (on originating "scopic drive").
39. See Christine Delphy, The Invention of French Feminism: An Essential Move, 87 YALE
FRENCH STUD. 190, 196 (1995).
40. MICHEL FOUCAULT, On Power, in POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE: INTERVIEWS





It is my view that it is the relation of theory to reality that
feminism changed, and it is in part a reversion to a prefeminist
relation of theory to reality that postmodernism is reimposing. This is
not about truth. Truth is a generality, an abstraction of a certain
shape and quality. Social realities are something else again.
Postmodernism has decided that because truth died with God, there
are no social facts. The fact that reality is a social construction does
not mean that it is not there; it means that it is there, in society, where
we live.
According to postmodernism, there are no facts; everything is a
reading, so there can be no lies. Apparently it cannot be known
whether the Holocaust is a hoax, whether women love to be raped,
whether Black people are genetically intellectually inferior to white
people, whether homosexuals are child molesters. To postmod-
ernists, these factish things are indeterminate, contingent, in play, all
a matter of interpretation. Similarly, whether or not acts of incest
happened or are traumatic to children become fogged over in
"epistemological quandaries" as beyond thinking, beyond narrative,
beyond intelligibility, as "this event that is no event"- as if survivors
have not often reported, in intelligible narratives, that such events did
happen and did harm them.41 That violation often damages speech
and memory does not mean that, if one has speech and memory, one
was not violated. Recall when Bill Clinton, asked about his sexual
relationship with a young woman intern, said that it all depended on
what "is" means. The country jeered his epistemic dodge as a
transparent and slimy subterfuge to evade accountability: get real.
The postmodernists were strangely silent. But you can't commit
perjury if there are no facts. Where are these people when you need
them?
What postmodernists want, I have come to think, apart from to
live in their heads instead of in the world (that old dodge), is to vault
themselves out of power methodologically. They want to beat
41. Judith Butler, Quandaries of the Incest Taboo, in WHOSE FREUD? THE PLACE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 39, 40-41 (Peter Brooks & Alex Woloch eds.,
2000). Reports of events of incest form the extensive database analyzed by DIANA E. H.
RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND WOMEN (1986). Widely
overlooked is the excellent study by Linda Williams that begins with medically documented acts
of child abuse and locates survivors 17 years later to inquire into their memory of the events.
Thirty-eight percent did not recall them. See Linda Meyer Williams, Recall of Childhood
Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women's Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 62 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1167 (1994).
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dominance at its own game, which is usually called dominating. They
want to win every argument in advance. Also, if everything is
interpretation, you can never be wrong. Feminism has faced that you
don't know what is real by getting outside your determinants (which
you can't do anyway) but by getting deep inside them with a lot of
other people with the same foot (even feet) on their necks.
Abdicating this, feminism's source of power, postmodernism has
swallowed the objective standpoint while claiming to be off on a
whole new methodological departure. Then they sigh and admit they
might have to concede partiality,42 meaning admitting only knowing
part. What, again, was the alternative? Totality? What's wrong with
partiality-except from the objective standpoint, which thinks it
means you can't be right? Who said there is either the whole or a
part? Postmodernism keeps becoming what it claims to supersede.43
If feminism is modernist-which is highly problematic, as it is as
much a critique of modernism 44- and postmodernists want to be post-
feminist, they have to take feminism with them and go further. They
often claim to. To be postmodern in this sense, the insights of
modernism and its critics into the inequalities of sex, race, and class
must, it seems to me, be taken on board before they can be gone
beyond.45  Instead of superceding these insights, postmodernists
routinely elaborately deny them, ignore them, act like they are not
there. This is premodern, as if feminism never existed. On the
question of continuity, whether postmodernism has much if anything
to say that modernism didn't, is also worth asking. The great modern,
42. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 23, at 119-20. For critique, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 81
(1986).
43. A specific form of this argument is made effectively, on postmodern terrain, in Susan
Bordo, "Material Girl": The Effacements of Postmodern Culture, in THE FEMALE BODY:
FIGURES, STYLES, SPECULATIONS 106 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1991). That postmodernism
claims to supercede modernism can be seen, for example, in Christine Di Stefano, Dilemmas of
Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodernism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra
note 16, at 63, 63 ("Postmodernism has taken things one step further" beyond theorists such as
Rousseau, Marx, and de Beauvoir.). She observes that it may "rerun, in updated garb," what it
claims to supercede. Id. at 77. If postmodernism sees itself superceding modernism by
discontinuity or rupture, it is not claiming to address modernism's concerns better than it does,
just to scratch a different itch, to use Wittgenstein's metaphor for what philosophy does. See
LUDWIG WrrTGENSTEIN, VERMISCHTE BEMERKUNGEN 14 (1977), quoted in RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE vii (1979). Perhaps part of the problem here is
that women's concerns are a lot more urgent and life-threatening than itches.
44. A useful discussion of this problem is found in Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/
Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254 (1992).
45. This Hegelian sublation postmodernists may disagree with as the path from modernism
to postmodernism. Maybe they should say what the "post" prefix means in its copula with
modernism. If it represents a rupture, why doesn't it have its own name?
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Gertrude Stein, wrote in 1946: "[T]here aint any answer, there aint
going to be any answer, there never has been an answer, that's the
answer. '46 How is postmodernism "post" that?
What I mean to say on the question of reality in theory is this:
When something happens to women, it happens in social reality. The
perspective from women's point of view does not mean that women's
reality can only be seen from there, hence is inaccessible to anyone
else and can't be talked about and does not exist. Rather, what can
be seen from the point of view of the subordination of women has
been there all along-too long. We wish it didn't exist but it can't be
wished out of existence. Anyone can see it. It can be found. It can
be ascertained. It can even be measured sometimes. It can be
discussed. Before us, it has been missed, overlooked, made invisible.
In other words, the harm of second class human status does not
pose an abstract reality question. In social life, there is little that is
subtle about most rapes; there is nothing complex about a fist in your
face; there is nothing nuanced about genocide-although many
nuanced questions no doubt can be raised about them. These social
realities, central to feminism, do not raise difficult first-order reality
questions, not any more.
It is the denial of their social reality that is complicated and raises
difficult philosophical questions. Understand that the denial of the
reality of such events has been a philosophical position about reality
itself. Unless and until effectively challenged, only what power wants
to see as real is granted reality status. Reality is a social status.
Power's reality does not have to establish itself as real in order to
exist, because it has the status as real that power gives it; only the
reality of the powerless has to establish itself as real. Power can also
establish unreality-like the harmlessness of pornography or
smoking-as reality. That doesn't make it harmless. But until power
is effectively challenged on these lies, and they are lies, only those
harmed (and those harming them, who have every incentive to
conceal) have access to knowing that that is what they are. So it has
taken us all this time, and a movement that has challenged male
power, to figure out that women's reality is also a philosophical
position: that women's reality exists, including women's denied
violation, therefore social reality exists separate from its constitution
by male power or its validation by male knowledge.
This analysis raises some questions about postmodernism that
46. GERTRUDE STEIN, BREWSM AND WILLIE 30 (1946).
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are not simply a report on my current mental state. They are: Can
postmodernism stop the rape of children when everyone has their
story, and everyone is presumably exercising sexual agency all the
time? Can postmodernism identify fascism if power only exists in
microcenters and never in systematic, fixed, and determinate
hierarchical arrangements? How can you oppose something that is
always only in play? How do you organize against something that
isn't even really there except when you are thinking about it? Can
postmodernism hold the perpetrators of genocide accountable? If the
subject is dead, and we are dealing with deeds without doers,47 how do
we hold perpetrators accountable for what they perpetrate? Can the
Serbian cultural defense for the extermination of Croats, Bosnian
Muslims, and Kosovar Albanians be far behind? If we can have a
multicultural defense for the current genocide, because that's how the
Serbs see it, why not a German cultural defense for the earlier one?
Anti-Semitism was part of German culture. Finally, for another old
question, if you only exist in opposition, if you are only full in
opposition to the modern,48 it has determined you. Don't you need an
account of how you are not merely reiterating your determinations?
From postmodernists, one is not yet forthcoming. The postmodernist
reality corrosion, thus, not only makes it incoherent and useless-the
pragmatists' valid criticism49- but also regressive, disempowering, and
collaborationist.
There is reality to many of the postmodernists' favorite concepts,
although they seldom talk about it. Take their "fragmented self."50
47. See BUTLER, supra note 20, at 25 ("A great deal of feminist theory and literature has
nevertheless assumed that there is a 'doer' behind the deed."). Nietzsche exposed the fallacy of
separating the doer from the deed. See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY
OF MORALS: A POLEMIC (Douglas Smith trans., 1996). Or, as Yeats asked, "How can we know
the dancer from the dance?" WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Among School Children, in THE
COLLECrED POEMS OF W. B. YEATS 212, 214 (1956). Behind the point on accountability is a
larger one pointing less toward a doer behind the deed-raising whether the self is the cause of
one's actions (as in Kant) or the effect of one's actions (as in Sartre)-and more to a doer
beyond the deed. Neither modernism nor feminism evaporates the subject, as postmodemism
seeks to do.
48. Another formulation of this same idea is that feminist postmodernism is "an
epistemology that justifies knowledge claims only insofar as they arise from enthusiastic
violation of the founding taboos of Western humanism." SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE
QUESTION IN FEMINISM 193 (1986).
49. For a lucid update on the state of this criticism, see RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY
AND SOCIAL HOPE 262-77 (1999).
50. The concept comes from Fredric Jameson. See FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM,
OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM 90 (1991); see also Trina Grillo, Anti-
Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 17 (1995); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A
Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J.
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In the material world they largely refuse to engage or countenance,
the fragmented self is a multiple personality. Multiplicity is created
through extreme, usually sexual, torture at a very young age.51
Postmodernists ought to have to confront the human pain of the ideas
they think are so much fun.52  Take being nomadic. My Bosnian
women clients are refugees. Will Rosi Braidotti's Nomadic Subjects
help them get through the day?53  Being a real nomad can include
being forced to flee your own country for your own survival as your
family is exterminated in front of you. Postmodernism celebrates
interculturality as a liberating head trip for its cultural rootlessness
and multiple possibilities. The actual experience can be something
else again. But then, Rosi did say homelessness only got fun after she
got tenure.54
One final example puts together these points about
postmodernism on women, method, multiculturalism, and therefore
social reality. It centers on a question, large in Western philosophy,
of whether the world exists independently of our ideas of it. This has
been a big male problem. An introduction to the postmodern
collection, Dominating Knowledge, by Stephen Marglin addresses it
by stating that the material world has objective reality but the social
world does not.55 His example is that although he knows the earth is
round (he doesn't say how), people used to think it was flat; in human
society, according to him, there is no reality, hence no knowing, like
296, 307 ("[The] post-modem approach starts from the notion of a fragmented and shifting
self.").
51. In a sample of 100 individuals who are multiple in a study conducted for the National
Institutes of Mental Health, 97% reported experiencing significant trauma in childhood, 83%
reported sexual abuse, 75% reported repeated physical abuse, and 68% reported both. See
Frank W. Putnam et al., The Clinical Phenomenology of Multiple Personality Disorder: Review
of 100 Recent Cases, 47 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 285, 289-90 (1986). Cumulative,
overwhelming, severe, long-lasting abuse was found related to the level of dissociation that
results from childhood trauma in a large sample of inpatients. See Nel Draijer & Willie
Langeland, Childhood Trauma and Perceived Parental Dysfunction in the Etiology of
Dissociative Symptoms in Psychiatric Inpatients, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 379 (1999); see also
JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 125-26 (1992).
52. A stark contrast to the conception of multiplicity discussed here is that of MARI J.
MATSUDA, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, in
WHERE IS YOUR BODY?, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE, GENDER, AND THE LAW 3 (1996).
53. See BRAIDOTTI, supra note 37, at 13 (referring glancingly to the Bosnian situation in
her discussion of language).
54. The printed version is: "[I]t was not until I found some stability and sense of partial
belonging, supported by a permanent job and a happy relationship, that I could actually start
thinking adequately about nomadism." Id. at 35.
55. Stephen A. Marglin, Towards the Decolonization of the Mind, in DOMINATING
KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND RESISTANCE 1, 12-14 (Fr6ddrique Apffel
Marglin & Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1990).
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that.56 The idea is, if you believe the social equivalent of the world is
flat-like, say, that women are inferior to men-it is. In society, there
is no reality, there is only what is thought to be real.
To illustrate this, he discusses the subject of "human sacrifice" in
a society that believes in its necessity:
Imagine the priestess called upon to explain the consequences of a
failure to sacrifice the requisite virgins in the requisite manner. She
might well say, "Society will fall apart. Our women and our land
will become barren because our men will become impotent as
lovers and ineffective as cultivators." And she will be right.
Believing themselves to be impotent in the hammock and
inefficient in the field, the men will be unable to perform in either
context. The birth rate will decline, and the harvest will fail.
Society will fall apart.... [B]eliefs bring about the very conditions
that will make these beliefs come true. 57
What we have here is a multicultural sexual and economic
rationalization for the murder of little girls. We also have a situation
in which men's erections can be dependent on killing female children.
Male impotence occupies the status of a fact; erections, I guess, exist.
What I want to say about this sort of thing is that no one is asking the
girls. The description of "the way things are" is from the position of a
man who is about to kill a child. Of course, in this example, it's put in
the mouth of a woman. Women often serve male power, and do have
power over children, but postmodernists have to portray women
actually having power that men largely have in order to confuse
people about power. (That they want to avoid being called sexist in
the process, we have accomplished.)
My point is this: what happens to the virgin being sacrificed is
independent of what she thinks about it. She may think that the crops
will grow just as well if she is alive tomorrow as if she is killed today.
She may even think her human rights are being violated. It makes no
difference to the reality of her getting killed today. No matter what
she thinks about it, she will be-be-dead. This seems to me very
simple: the reality of people who don't have power exists
independently of what they think. The social constructs that control
their lives very often are not their constructs. What women think
doesn't tend to make things be the way we think because we don't
have the social power to do them or to stop them. Any woman who
doesn't know this, in my opinion, has not pushed very hard on the
walls around her and other women, or has been, so far, very




privileged and very lucky.
The reason that it doesn't appear to men (especially men of the
theory class) that the world exists independently of their minds is
because they largely do have the power to do whatever happens in
their minds. If they want, in their minds, to kill her, they can do that.
If they want it to give them erections, it will. So they naturally don't
know what comes first, it or them. What this means is that women
are the ones who know something about social reality as such, which
is the extent of its independence of mind. If social reality is
independent of our minds, it's independent of mind, and men just
think it isn't because of their social location.
Women are in a position to know this to the extent that reality
does not respond to us. What we know is that the power to make
reality be real is a product of social power to act, not just to imagine.
We know that reality is about power because we can imagine change
all day long and nothing is any different. This is a criticism; it is not
an inevitability. We can collectively intervene in social life, but not if
we deny that it is there or what makes it be there. We can even
imagine, long enough to organize to stop these men, what could
happen if some such girls got away with their lives and the crops kept
right on growing. Steven Marglin is not asking this girl if society will
fall apart if she lives. We are. We are, if you will, an improbable
movement of the escapees and survivors of such sacrifice.
Yes, society is largely made of peoples' consciousness of social
relations. That doesn't mean that everyone's consciousness
constitutes social reality equally. As long as social reality is a product
of inequality, and postmodernists refuse to contend with social
inequality methodologically, postmodernism will go on adopting the
methodological position of male power, and the politics of the
women's movement of the 1970s will be dead, in theory. Meantime,
women in the world will go on fighting to change the unequal social
realities of women's lives as if postmodernism did not exist.
III.
If it is to contribute to feminism's future, postmodernism has, I
think, some questions to answer. What is its account of itself? How
convenient to repudiate account-giving when it seems to have none,
at least no presentable one. What are its grounds? Now this is an
aggressive question. Thinking grounds matter, they repudiate as
"foundationalism." But what are the sexual and material pre-
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conditions for this theory? David Harvey traces the economic and
cultural forces of late twentieth-century capitalism that, in his
analysis, have produced, read determined, postmodernism. 8 What
does this suggest about their ability to promote change? What is
postmodernism's project? How linear, how teleological, how serious.
To whom and what is it accountable? I say it is accountable to
academic hierarchy. Who else can afford this theory?
Postmodernism appropriates its methodological pretensions and
gestures from feminism, but it doesn't practice them. Its reality
position is closer to the premodern, certainly the prefeminist, a
throwback to before the feminism initially described. So it's forward
to the past: to yet another set of abstractions with no accountability to
subordinated peoples' reality and an implicit but total accountability
to power, with familiar if fancier reasons for doing nothing - radical-
sounding, but with the same origins, a dislocated elite, and the same
consequences, a disengaged theory, that corrodes material resistance
to power.
Postmodernism's analysis of the social construction of reality is
stolen from feminism and the left but gutted of substantive content-
producing Marxism without the working class, feminism without
women. It's an abstract critique of abstract subjects. The hall of
mirrors (that's plural) that much of postmodernism substitutes for
any attempt to grasp a real social world is an ultimate collapse into
liberalism's relativism regresses. As mildly put by Alan Sokal and
Jean Bricmont, "relativism is an extremely weak foundation on which
to build a criticism of the existing social order."5 9  Once
postmodernism's various acts of theft and sell-out are exposed, what
is left is a pose, an empty gesture of theatrical anarchism (to which
Marx's critique applies), a Hegelian negation of the status quo (and
just as determined by it), liberalism's terrible child (many liberals
look plenty grounded and engaged by comparison), a precious politics
of abdication and passivism.
I do know this: we cannot have this postmodernism and still have
a meaningful practice of women's human rights, far less a women's
movement. Ironically, and how postmodernism loves an irony, just as
women have begun to become human, even as we have begun to
transform the human so it is something more worth having and might
apply to us, we are told by high theory that the human is inherently
58. HARVEY, supra note 18, at 116-17, is particularly cogent.
59. SOKAL & BRICMONT, supra note 11, at 209.
[Vol. 75:687
POINTS AGAINST POSTMODERNISM
authoritarian, not worth having, untransformable, and may not even
exist-and how hopelessly nineteenth-century of us to want it.6°
(That few of the feminist postmodernists, had it not been for the
theory of humanity they criticize, would have been permitted to learn
to read and write-this is perhaps a small point.)
The reason postmodernism undermines a practice of human
rights is not because it corrodes universality. Human rights in the real
world are proving far less attached to their Enlightenment baggage
than are the intellectuals who guard its theory. The reason is, the
reality of violation is the only ground the violated have to stand on to
end it. Power and its pretenders think they can dispense with ground
because they are in no danger of losing theirs or the power that goes
with it. Postmodernism vitiates human rights to the extent it erects
itself on its lack of relation to the realities of the subordinated
because it is only in social reality that human violation takes place,
can be known, and can be stopped.
This analysis in turn raises a question feminism has not had to
answer before, as critically as we do now, because we never had a
theory class before: what is the place of the academy in the
movement? Postmodernism, empty as much of it is, is taking up a lot
of feminist theoretical energy in this one world that we all go to sleep
in and wake up in. Postmodernism is an academic theory, originating
in academia with an academic elite, not in the world of women and
men, where feminist theory is rooted. In the early 1970s, I (for one)
had imagined that feminists doing theory would retheorize life in the
concrete rather than spend the next three decades on metatheory,
talking about theory, rehashing over and over in this disconnected
way how theory should be done, leaving women's lives twisting in the
wind. Too, theorizing about little except other theories of theories
provides little experience on how to do it.
My feeling is, if the postmodernists took responsibility for
changing even one real thing, they would learn more about theory
than everything they have written to date put together. Instead, as
practiced by postmodernists, the job of theory, as the blood sport of
the academic cutting edge, is to observe and pass on and play with
these big questions, out of touch with and unaccountable to the lives
of the unequal. Their critically-minded students are taught that
60. A different version of this point is made by Nancy Hartsock, Rethinking Modernism:
Minority vs. Majority Theories, CULTURAL CRITIQUE, Fall 1997, at 187, 204-06. The
postmodernists are to be thanked for drawing a line that makes me feel part of a tradition that I
never felt much included in before.
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nothing is real, that disengagement is smart (not to mention career-
promoting), that politics is pantomime and ventriloquism, that reality
is a text (reading is safer than acting any day), that creative
misreading is resistance (you feel so radical and comfortably
marginal), that nothing can be changed (you can only amuse
yourself). With power left standing, the feminism of this theory
cannot be proven by any living woman. It is time to ask these people:
what are you doing?
